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Abstract The links between the processes of globalisation and the generation of risk
have been brought into sharp focus as a function of a series of accidents and terrorist
attacks on Western interests and their supply chains. The increasingly interconnected
nature of organisations, the dependence of western economies on a set of global supply
chains, the export of hazardous goods and services, and the recruitment of staff from a
global recruitment pool, all generate the potential for new forms of hazard and require
organisations to reconfigure and extend the capabilities of their control and monitoring
systems. Our aim in this article is to review the challenges that globalisation processes
can generate for organisational effectiveness and, in particular, on the performance of
processes around risk management and the prevention of crises.
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Introduction
There is a bitter irony in that the fruits of globalisation – technology, free
international trade – have been turned into weapons against the globalised
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economy by those whom globalisation has failed. There is perhaps no better
illustration of the dark side of globalisation than the deadly juxtaposition of
hungry, qat-chewing men toting Kalashnikovs and computerised navigational
technology.
(Brannigan, 2013)
Our focus in this article is with the ‘dark side’ of globalisation high-lighted by Brannigan and its impact on risk management. The article’stitle came from a chance conversation with another colleague who,
when one of the authors produced a branded soft drink, uttered a cry of:
‘Ah, the dark waters of imperialism’. While clearly intended as a humorous
interjection, it did serve to generate a subsequent series of discussions around
the processes of globalisation, their relationships to forms of economic and
political imperialism, and the impact that a range of globalising forces can have
on both the configuration of risk and the potential for generating subsequent
crises for organisations and local populations. The comment, and the discussion
that followed, served to highlight the role that Western trans-national corpora-
tions play in the generation and export of risk, the exploitation of economically
weak countries (and regions) and the creation of dependent markets among
poor communities for their products. At the same time, there is also a counter-
current that takes place in the form of resistance, public opposition and, in some
contexts, criminal acts. The opening quote from Brannigan also highlights the
dichotomy that is often articulated in discussions around globalisation, namely
the uneven distribution of the benefits and costs associated with it, and the
manner in which certain groups have been ‘radicalised’ or criminalised into
taking action against such (largely Western) global interests. This process of
defining such opposition as ‘radicalised’ is invariably a value judgment and
many would frame opposition to globalisation forces in terms of legitimate
resistance by those who are exploited and oppressed by powerful corporations
(Routledge, 1996, 2000, 2003). Thus, the terrain over which the processes and
consequences of globalisation range is clearly an uneven and fractured one. Not
surprisingly, this is mirrored in the relationship between globalisation and the
generation of risk and crisis.
Although clearly a beneficial process for some, globalisation has also added
to the range of spatial inequalities that exist and has, in a number of cases,
generated a new portfolio of hazards. These hazards have emerged as a
consequence of the scale of those economic processes that drive globalisation
and have also generated emergent conditions that have provided unintended
consequences for both rich and poor states.
Two examples serve to illustrate the complex dynamics of the circuits and
flows (Hudson, 2004) that are associated with globalising processes. First, the
failure of the sub-prime market, the deregulation of particular markets and the
global recession that followed that triggering event, propelled many Western
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countries into a state of crisis and eroded confidence in financial institutions
(Owens, 2012). This crisis illustrated the limitations of key assumptions around
increases in the value of house prices, the willingness of individuals to incur debt
and the effectiveness of governance and control mechanisms that were
supposed to be in place to manage the behaviours of financial institutions. The
crisis also illustrated the subsequent difficulties that governments faced in trying
to contain the impact of the collapse and highlighted the problems that exist
around the limitations of technical expertise when dealing with low-probability,
high-consequence events. The sub-prime crisis also typified the difficulties
associated with risk prediction when the uncertainty within the information
available to decision makers around cause-and-effect relationships is high.
As a consequence, assumptions were made around the perceived key risk
parameters but these had weak predictive capability, especially given the lack
of prior experience with these risk factors. Expert judgments and the
determination of the burden of proof around the probability and conse-
quences of failure also sit at the core of the sub-prime crisis. The intercon-
nected nature of the financial markets saw the crisis irradiate a number of
Western economies and it exposed a series of underlying structural weak-
nesses within trading blocs such as the European Union. Financialisation has
been seen as changing the underlying processes of the economy and can be
seen as linked to the processes around globalisation, although the nature and
significance of these relationships have been contested (Dore, 2008; van der
Zwan, 2014; Aalbers, 2015; Christophers, 2015; Lawrence, 2015). There is a
view that sees the processes around financialisation as generating risk through
the power of technical expertise and increased volatility within the system
(Pike and Pollard, 2010) and that has resulted from the ‘tightly coupled’ and
‘interactively complex’ (Perrow, 1984) nature of the finance sector. The risks
associated with financialisation, especially those processes exposed in the
2008 crisis, have highlighted the spatial dynamics of the harm that is
generated through the various circuits and flows of capital (Wainwright,
2012, 2013). Invariably, these spatial and temporal processes have generated
problems around the governance of the sector and the controls available to
deal with trans-national capital. Despite concerns expressed around the
underlying cultural factors that impacted upon the crisis, changing the culture
of the finance sector has proved to be difficult (Wilmarth, 2009; Ashby, 2011;
Kerr and Robinson, 2011; Vaiman et al, 2011).
The second example also highlights the difficulties associated with govern-
ance and control. The ‘dark waters’ referred to in the title of the article have
another, perhaps more sinister meaning, as they point to the problems that have
emerged in the last 20 years relating to the increased risks from piracy, criminal
behaviours and terrorist activities across global supply chains (Barnes and
Oloruntoba, 2005). While piracy and crime are not new phenomena, the sense
of injustice, the generation of failed nation states, the increased opportunities
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for crime generated by globalisation and the lack of legitimate economic
opportunities for local communities are often held as key drivers for the
re-emergence of such ‘criminal acts’1 (Leeson, 2009; Murphy, 2009; Pham, 2010).
A range of issues around increased conflict, environmental impacts and the
emergence of powerful crime lords have led to further exploitation of local,
already impoverished, communities and provided drivers into piracy and, in
some cases, terrorism (Kavanagh, 2011; Daxecker and Prins, 2013; Jablonski
and Oliver, 2013).
Both of these examples highlight the pluralist nature of globalisation and the
manner in which it impacts upon, and is shaped by, the various domains
associated with it. For Rennen and Martens (2003), these domains include
socio-cultural factors, economic drivers, environmental dynamics and the
political context in which these processes occur. The increased development of
communications and transport technologies has also been seen as important
drivers of the globalisation process (Cairncross, 2001; Rennen and Martens,
2003). The complex nature of the circuits and flows that links these domains
together generates emergent conditions as a function of new forms of inter-
action. Invariably, this emergence will manifest itself in new operating condi-
tions that move the system outside of its designed-for control parameters, or it
will create hazards that had not be considered as likely or viable before the
effects of these emergent conditions became realised.
These emergent forms of risk form part of a wider mosaic of hazards that are
seen as being imposed upon local populations within a globalised setting. The
communities that host such hazards are often poorly equipped to actively
oppose them through legitimate means – that is, economically, politically and
scientifically – and so often have to revert to actions that are deemed to be
illegitimate or illegal by both Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) and
foreign governments. This then serves to criminalise these already disadvan-
taged communities as they resist exploitation (Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Watts,
2007; Obi, 2010). The dark side of globalisation has, therefore, generated a
multi-level, asymmetric set of issues that have, in some cases, served to
generate further problems and unintended consequences. Increasingly, the
debates around globalisation have concerned its role in generating new forms
of hazard, changing the distributions of the hazards that exist or providing
additional scope for intervention when catastrophic failures occur. A central
tenet of these discussions concerns the relationships between the drivers and
processes surrounding globalisation and the generation of risk at multiple
points in space and time.
Our aim in this article is to consider whether the processes around globalisa-
tion have generated hazards that lie outside of more traditional approaches
taken to risk management. The challenges here can be seen to group around
three main issues. First, the potential hazards facing organisations need to be
assessed in a holistic manner. Because of the distances over which activities are
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carried out, reductionist approaches to managing risk are unlikely to capture
the potential for emergent conditions, especially across different environmental
settings. Second, the circuits and flows that underpin globalisation (Hudson,
2000) generate additional hazards through the vulnerability of supply chains
(Peck, 2005; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Third, local populations can react
negatively to the actions of trans-national organisations and this can cause local
forms of resistance that are both disruptive and damaging to an organisation’s
reputation, especially as groups increasingly use social media as a means of
engaging public support for that local resistance (Mackey, 2015). In order to
frame these challenges for risk management, we need to contextualise them
within the wider set of processes around globalisation. Our aim is to set out the
parameters in which more holistic approaches to risk need to be carried out.
The remainder of the article sets out the contexts in which the various spaces
of production and consumption (Hudson, 2000, 2001, 2004) give rise to
destructive processes.
The Nature of Globalisation? Elements of a Debate
Globalization encompasses many things: the international flow of ideas and
knowledge, the sharing of cultures, global civil society, and the global environ-
mental movement …………. globalization has the potential to bring enormous
benefits to those in both the developing and the developed world. But the
evidence is overwhelming that it has failed to live up to this potential.
(Stiglitz, 2006, p. 4)
While the creation of markets for goods and services is part of the natural order
of business, there are some products and services that are clearly problematic
and exploitative and which have the potential to cause harm. These range from
the export of hazardous materials and processes through to the creation of
new markets for products that are both harmful and heavily restricted in many
traditional markets in Western countries. One obvious example of the latter is
the export of cigarettes and the ways in which tobacco companies seek to
circumvent local restrictions and controls to create new markets (Gruner, 1996;
Yach and Bettcher, 2000; Gilmore and McKee, 2004; Lambert et al, 2004).
Problematic exports are not, however, restricted to those that have hazardous
consequences. It is possible that even some basic commodities, and those that
have clear health benefits (Sridharan and Viswanathan, 2008; Cross and Street,
2009; Weidner et al, 2010), can also generate unforeseen consequences. For
example, the distribution of soap into extremely poor communities can have
extremely positive health benefits, as hand-washing is seen as an essential
element in gastrointestinal disease reduction (Curtis & Cairncross 2003; Shahid
et al, 1996). However, if these soap products are priced at a level that the poorer
sections of society cannot afford them in the longer term then it can generate a
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series of reputational problems in terms of the ways in which such products are
marketed (Gupta and Jaiswal, 2013). The blowback generated in such cases is
largely in terms of reputational damage as, despite the positive intentions
associated with introducing soap into such environments, critics of TNCs will
invariably see it in terms of building market share and exploiting the poor. So,
unless products are priced according to the economic context prevailing in the
locations where they are introduced, then companies may be faced with
additional reputational risks.
Globalisation also supports two-way flows and there is a counter-current of
goods that are exported (often illegally) into Western markets and which
sometimes fail to meet stringent local standards or are possibly counterfeit.
Examples include digital and pharmaceutical counterfeiting (Aldhous, 2005;
Banerjee et al, 2005), with the latter resulting in deleterious health effects and,
some cases, their coexistence with legitimate products within a retail environ-
ment.2 These illicit trades often utilise the same technologies and transport
mechanisms that support globalisation and they generate significant challenges
for regulatory agencies around governance and control. For the company
whose branded products are counterfeited, this also creates additional chal-
lenges around brand integrity and the possible generation of reputational crises.
The flows and counter-flows that underpin globalisation serve to generate
hazards at multiple levels within the system. The circuits and flows of people,
information (including ideologies) and resources also have the potential to
generate emergent conditions that can exceed the control mechanisms that are
put in place to prevent harm. These complex ‘circuits of capital’ (Hudson, 2004,
2009) can, for example, serve to generate a landscape of imbalances in which
the potential exists for criminal groups to exploit fractures in controls that arise
over an extended sphere of operations. This has changed the nature of the
managerial challenges around organisational controls, human resource recruit-
ment and management, as well as the provision of organisational security.
Figure 1 illustrates the broader nature of this process and provides a context for
our discussion here.
These flows can invariably be one- or two-way and the flow patterns may be
bi-lateral, constrained or restricted. In addition, these circuits and flows may be
legal or illicit (Hudson, 2009, 2014). As such, the flows and circuits of ‘capital’
within and between the various spaces of production and consumption can be
complex (Hudson, 2000) and, as a consequence, generate the potential for
emergent conditions that arise out of those interactions. The resultant ‘spaces of
destruction’ can extend over time as the impacts associated with this range of
activities can be either immediate- or delayed-in-effect (Fischbacher-Smith,
2011). This dynamic environment creates managerial challenges for organisa-
tions and invariably generates fractures in control and governance arrange-
ments. There are, for example, considerable risks associated with the
recruitment and selection processes that are increased within a global market.
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While much of the discourse within business and the academy is around the
selection of ‘global talent’ (Tarique and Schuler, 2010; Schuler et al, 2011;
Sparrow, 2012) there is, at the same time, an increased set of risks associated
with the threats from insiders and the challenges in vetting and approving staff
appointments within such a global setting (Warkentin and Willison, 2009;
Minbaeva and Collings, 2013; Holdaway, 2014; Fischbacher-Smith, 2015).
The advances in communications technologies, and the ability to store large
volumes of data on relatively small devices, has also increased the scale of
potential harm that insiders can cause. This point was so forcefully illustrated
by the ability of Edward Snowden to download considerable amounts of highly
sensitive information from within a supposedly secure environment
(Greenwald, 2014; Gurnow, 2014). Increased capability around communica-
tions and data sharing, although generally a positive process, also serves to
increase the potential risks from hacking, the threats associated with the
coercion of staff by outsiders and the willingness of disenfranchised colleagues
to cause harm. Advanced communication technologies can provide the means
for criminal groups to undertake illegal acts. This is often done at a distance and
beyond the ‘normal’ reach of Western police and security agencies. If we add to
this the increased distances over which TNCs operate, then the potential points
of vulnerability around infiltration and data theft can be seen to increase
considerably. The extended supply chains of organisations also increases the
potential vulnerabilities that are embedded in control systems. Globalisation
can, therefore, be seen to have contributed to the creation of a complex mosaic
of hazards and the disproportionate distributions of costs and benefits
associated with the opening up of markets.
Figure 1: Flows and counter-flows within globalisation.
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Where people and valuable resources are transported through, or in close
proximity to, disadvantaged areas, the opportunities for piracy, kidnapping
and theft may also attract the attention of the criminally minded. Economic
forces also generate the movements of people as they seek to improved their
economic standing or escape from conflict zones. While the movement of
people within coalitions, such as the European Union, is generally seen as a
positive processes for the recruitment of global talent, it also risks generating
a population of the disenfranchised who are unable to find work and who
blame immigrant workers for that. As the problems at Calais and across the
Mediterranean in 2015 have also highlighted, the diasporas of the dispossessed
that arise from both armed conflicts and economic crises can also be consider-
able. Again, this movement and displacement of people is both fuelled, and
supported, by globalising forces.
The article now turns to consider the processes that underpin the generation
of hazards within the context of the production-consumption-destruction
(P-C-D) framework. The dominant approach here draws heavily on a systems
perspective in dealing with the processes around enterprise-related risk. The
remainder of the article attempts to illustrate how the various elements in the
P-C-D framework interact with each other and how the evolution of the system
can move it away from its designed for state into one that exceeds the
parameters of control.
A System of Destruction
Figure 2 seeks to conceptualise these processes by integrating the various spaces
of production and consumption (Hudson, 2000, 2001, 2004) with the notion of
spaces of destruction (Fischbacher-Smith, 2011). These spaces are linked
together in time by both legitimate and illicit flows that are facilitated, in turn,
by a range of underpinning technologies. The result is that destruction becomes
manifest in various places over time within the wider system. Many of these
processes are difficult to observe in real-time because of their multi-layered
nature and the temporal effects that serve to cloak cause-and-effect relation-
ships. Figure 2 attempts to illustrate these interactions and highlights the role of
both legitimate and illicit flows within the generation of destruction. The key
processes here can be seen to group around three key theoretical overlapping
constructs. The first is the notion of incubation and error cost (Turner, 1976,
1978, 1994; Collingridge, 1980, 1992) in which the potential for failure is
generated as a function of the routine decision-making processes within an
organisation. These ‘latent conditions’ can then be exposed by more opera-
tional forms of human error or violations (Reason, 1990, 1997, 2000) or by the
compression of time horizons within the functional elements of the systems
processes (Radell, 1992). The second set of processes that are important here
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relate to the erosion of systems defences, either by an act of omission or
commission, so that triggering events can escalate to cause catastrophic failure
(Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1987; Turner, 1994; Tenner, 1996). The final set of
processes concerns the role of emergent conditions in generating new forms of
threat or failure conditions for which no controls exist (Erikson, 1994;
Fischbacher-Smith, 2014). These emergent conditions can move a system away
from its designed-for state into a new operating state that lies outside of its
normal control parameters (Tsoukas, 1999; Hodge and Coronado, 2007).
Moving a system to a new equilibrium state can generate vulnerabilities because
of constrained sensemaking processes and the lack of effective control that it
can generate (Weick, 1988, 1990, 1993). In many cases, the cost associated
with these error-producing conditions only becomes obvious much further
down the decision time-line. Over time, these processes can generate pathways
of vulnerability (Smith, 2005) in which the incubation of risk potential occurs
as a function of the routine decision-making processes within the organisation
(Turner, 1976) and where human errors (both latent and active), along with
violations, can serve to erode the organisational defences that are in place
(Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Collingridge, 1992; Reason, 1997). This is
particularly problematic when the organisations concerned operate across
increased geographical distances and scale (Collingridge, 1992). The outcome
of these processes is that organisations are moved away from their designed-for
state into an equilibrium state that is outside of the established control
parameters for the organisation and its core activities.
Figure 2: A system of destruction.
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Within the interactions outlined above, the errors that are generated need to
be considered in both strategic and operational terms and can also be a function
of both accidental and intentional acts, where the costs of those errors are only
recognised in other places or in future systems states. A central dynamic here is
the role of expert judgement in shaping the nature of those decisions and
the recognition that expertise is limited when dealing with low-probability,
high-consequence events. Expertise plays a role across the P-C-D framework
and is also an important element in dealing with the technologies, circuits and
flows that drive and shape these various ‘spaces’. The ability of organisations to
design and manage the system of production-consumption and the associated
circuits and flows is often functionally dependent on the flows of information
and expertise and the utilisation of the knowledge that arises out of those
interactions. However, as the financial crash has illustrated, the knowledge base
associated with low-probability, high-consequence events is often problematic
and the predictive capabilities of organisational decision makers is weak as a
consequence. Another important element here relates to the trust that decision
makers have in those experts who provide advice and guidance and the
effectiveness of regulatory and governance arranges in preventing unacceptable
risk-taking (Dore, 2008; Olsen, 2011; da Veiga et al, 2012).
Against this broad background, Stiglitz (2006) also highlights a number of
aspects of globalisation that can be seen to have negative consequences and that
need to be considered in more detail within our present discussions. The first of
these concerns the International flow of ideas and knowledge (Stiglitz, 2006).
In and of itself, this can be seen as a positive process as it can challenge many of
the outdated ideas and superstitions that exist in many parts of the world. The
Ebola outbreak in 2014–2015 highlighted the suspicions that some commu-
nities have about Western forms of medicine (Briand et al, 2014) and the
problems surrounding local health infrastructures attempting to contain
virulent disease outbreaks (Koroma and Lv, 2015). Here globalisation is a
double-edged problem. It allows for additional resources to flow into an
infected area but it also generates the potential for the infection to be
transmitted globally because of the flows of people via international travel
(Wilder-Smith and Gubler, 2008). In contrast, the flows of information and
knowledge, which should be important elements in the erosion of beliefs within
many of the poor African nations, failed to address some of the problems
around witchcraft and superstition as elements in disease transmission
(Tenkorang et al, 2011). Similarly, globalisation has often failed to improve
the general awareness around public health, despite the promised increases in
education and communication that it offers. The flow of ideas and information
also played a major role in the Arab Spring, as local groups utilised social media
to share information and concerns about the established order in a number of
Middle Eastern countries (Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011; Khondker, 2011). Out
of this disruption, there also emerged a set of drivers that coalesced around
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revolutionary change (Joffé, 2011; Kamrava, 2012; Bayat, 2013; Lynch et al,
2014) and these may well have served to help sustain the growth in the so-called
Islamic State (ISIS), and especially its use of social media (Bradley, 2012;
Farwell, 2014; Klausen, 2014; Stansfield, 2014). ISIS have effectively used
social media to attract recruits from across Europe and the Middle East to their
cause, and to promote their particular message of fundamentalist Islam (Atran
et al, 2014; Stansfield, 2014). ISIS has also used one of the core elements of
globalisation – the flow of ideas and knowledge though electronic forms of
communication – against the West and, although not the first such group to use
this approach, they have arguably been the most successful. Far from providing
for the transmission of a common set of largely Western values, globalising
forces have been instrumental in allowing anti-Western and anti-globalisation
sentiments to gain widespread traction.
The second and related issue identified by Stiglitz concerns the range of
processes associated with ‘the sharing of cultures’ (p. 4). The forces of
globalisation can be seen to have a goal of potentially homogenising cultures
(invariably, as critics suggest, around a US model) rather than allowing for a
two-way sharing. It effectively subsumes the cultures in those countries, which
it ‘invades’ and seeks to convert them to a set of largely Western values in what
could be seen as an attempt at a cultural hegemony. What this process generates
are various forms of resistance by local communities. There have been several
examples of this resistance to globalisation (Routledge, 1996, 2000; Chin and
Mittelman, 1997) and this pushing back has become all the more apparent in
the wake of the so-called ‘war on terror’ that was prosecuted after the attacks of
11 September. The current problems in Iraq, the rise of ISIS and the migrations
of young people to fight for, and against, ISIS all point to the problems that can
arise when the sharing of culture via globalisation is seen as little more than an
attempt to supplant local cultures with Western values. The backlash to this
often serves to push that culture towards a more fundamentalist extreme.
Again, this process of blowback (Bergen and Reynolds, 2005) – a form of the
law of unintended consequences – is a powerful factor in shaping resistance and
generating emergence. The upsurge in nationalism in certain countries and the
difficulties that exist in large economic blocs such as the European Union,
highlight the different ways in which the effects of globalisation can generate
both emergent conditions and economic inequalities that can fuel a nationalist
agenda. This has been brought into sharp focus with the economic problems
faced by Greece, which have generated considerable resentment against the
main agencies of globalisation as perceived by local actors. The power of
international capital to shape local conditions within countries have also led to
calls to resist the imposed austerity cultures that these agencies demand to deal
with national deficits.
Stiglitz also highlights the importance of international networks in raising
concerns about environmental impacts. The 1980s saw the emergence of
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debates around the export of hazardous activities that highlighted the ways in
which organisations would seek to exploit gaps in regulatory frameworks and
differences in operating costs (Shrivastava, 1987). The accidents at Bhopal and
Chernobyl also highlighted the potential that existed within socio-technical
systems to cause mass fatalities and both accidents also illustrated the tensions
around different regulatory frameworks for the controls of such hazards.
Cherobyl highlighted the potential Hans-boundary effects of a major radio-
active accident and the difficulties associated with the implementation of
effective global standards for performance and safety. Bhopal highlighted the
potentially exploitative nature of Western TNCs who actively sought to export
hazardous activities and materials to regulatory regimes that were much weaker
(Smith and Blowers, 1992). Thirty years later, similar processes can be seen to
be still at work but the risks that they generate are different (Idemudia and Ite,
2006; Hudson, 2009, 2014). While the presence of a ‘global environmental
movement’ (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 4) can generally seen as a positive force associated
with globalisation, it also reflects the potential that exists for other forms of
networks, some of which may have malevolent intent, to use the tools of
globalisation (especially the freedom of travel, communications technologies,
and processes around knowledge exchange) as a means of opposing that wider
process (Daxecker and Prins, 2013; Lemieux et al, 2014). Friedman argues that
the current stage of the globalisation process is increasingly typified by the
collaboration of individuals in distributed networks in a ‘flat world platform’
(Friedmann, 2006) in which the accumulation and transfer of knowledge will
allow for new forms of collaboration, some of which may be destructive
(Friedman, 2005). The presence of the so-called ‘dark web’ (Chen et al, 2008)
highlights the destructive conditions that can be created by such technological
advancement when it is used for criminal activities (Xu et al, 2006; Etges and
Sutcliffe, 2008; Fu et al, 2010). The ‘hidden’ layers of the Internet provide a
space for the range of illicit activities leading to an ongoing arms race between
law enforcement agencies and those who seek to break the law. Hudson (2014)
argues that there is a strong link between the development of those capitalist
economies that are the driving force behind globalisation and a range of
associated illegal activities. He likens this relationship to one in which:
The legal and illegal are locked into a systematic symbiotic relationship which is
contingently expressed in and constituted through their patterning in time and
space and in the relationships between their flows, paths and spaces.
(Hudson, 2014, p. 775)
These legal and illegal economic drivers interact together to create a set of
circuits of capital that underpin a range of risk-generating problems that cause
harm to both people and processes. The combination of the flows (ideas,
knowledge, ideology, people and products) and these circuits of capital are
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aided by the development of dark technologies to create mechanisms for
generating and sustaining flows that remain hidden to those regulatory
authorities that seek to constrain them. These dark technologies and the use of
such financial transfer mechanisms as Bitcoin serve as a means of by-passing
international controls (Chen et al, 2008; Stevens, 2009; Keene, 2011; Bronk
et al, 2012; Stokes, 2012) and create challenges for legal systems on a global
scale (Pocar, 2004; Grabosky, 2007). Again, the Internet has aided in this
process and has hastened the creation of illegal international supply chains for
illicit goods (drugs, firearms), the trafficking of people, and a range of counter-
feit products that often intermingle with legitimate ones at the point of sale
(Wertheimer et al, 2003; Aldhous, 2005; Dégardin et al, 2014). Thus, the
asymmetry within the process (where small groups are able to challenge
the cultural and economic hegemonies of larger, more powerful nations and
organisations) is aided by the emergent conditions that are generated as a result
of these interactions between globalising technologies.
The Dark Drivers of Harm
Figure 3 highlights those key dark drivers of the globalising process that can be
seen to generate the potential for a range of hazards. It is the interactions
between these elements that serve to generate the complex landscape of risks
that arise from globalisation and that occur over space and time. These ‘spaces
of destruction’ (Fischbacher-Smith, 2011) are shaped by a range of interactions
between these drivers that can then produce associated ‘pathways of vulner-
ability’ (Smith, 2005) through which harm can be generated. The manner in
which those hazards are incubated (Turner, 1976) takes on a different
perspective within a globalised context where the potential for emergent
conditions and asymmetry is high and where the identification of local forms
of failure is problematic.
Figure 3: The dark drivers of globalisation.
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Firstly, there are different perceptions relating to the range of pervasive
processes around globalisation. The movement of goods, services, labour and
capital, contributes to the creation of a market in which inputs and outputs are
brought together across multiple locations to allow goods, and increasingly
services, from different parts of the world to coalesce in a particular setting.
These exploitative processes – such as, the increased activities in people
trafficking, the movement of arms and the globalised nature of the narcotics
trade – are not new but they have been enhanced by technological developments
and global economic imbalances (Castells, 2010; Hudson, 2014). These dark
processes around globalisation are also important elements of that wider
phenomena. Whether one depicts these relationships to be the reaped benefits
of an all encompassing, beneficial and inevitable process of globalisation or the
remnants of an imperialistic and exploitative system, which disempowers
the vulnerable, will be a reflection of the ideological stance from which one
makes sense of the processes involved. Whatever the stance taken, globalisation
clearly helps to create interdependencies between elements of production
and consumption systems, and allows fractures in controls within globalised
organisations to go largely unnoticed unless and until, the system fails
catastrophically.
Secondly, these processes can be seen to generate a range of consequences,
the most obvious being environmental impacts, that transcend control mechan-
isms (either intentionally or as an ‘accidental’ or emergent condition), and that
cause differential forms of harm across a global landscape. The costs and
benefits of these processes are borne by different social groupings. Although
such differential effects are not new, the scales over which they operate have
increased as a function of globalising processes.
Thirdly, the obsession with the global market as an engine of economic
growth has also served to shape and possibly undermine the nature of
accountability and governance. These should be cornerstones of the risk
management process but they are severely eroded when the potential sources
of hazard transcend different regulatory regimes and where there is no
agreement on international standards of performance around many aspects of
risk. Of course, for most of us living in Western democratic environments, we
take many of the positive benefits around globalisation for granted. We can see
the benefits associated with a global supply chain for the goods and services
that we depend on and we rarely face the consequences of those risk-generating
processes. As a result, many of the demands for greater controls and governance
come from those poor communities who are directly affected by these hazards
but who are also the least able to effect change. The conflicts around oil
production in the Niger Delta provide an example of this issue (Idemudia and
Ite, 2006). Western countries are often only mobilised into action when the
hazards impact directly on them (often in the form of terrorism or crime) or
where social media has been used to galvanise public support. A recent example
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of such public advocacy concerns the pressure brought3 against Unilever
following a Mercury spill from one of their plants in India (Mackey, 2015).
Fourthly, there is also a hegemonic aspect of the globalising processes, in
which countries seek to generate influence in an attempt to ensure that they have
access to resources. Historically, these processes were associated with the more
traditional imperialist states but this has evolved to include other countries and,
increasingly, multi-nationals. The agreements reached around resource utilisation
often benefit the political elites within the countries concerned, leaving the
general population with little benefit and often with much of the costs. Such
exploitation can take multiple forms. The most obvious generates a series of
potential hazards when Western companies export hazardous process and
activities to take advantage of weaker regulatory regimes. The accident at Bhopal
in 1984 killed in excess of 3000 people, many of whom lived in poverty in shanty
dwellings around the plant. Union Carbide then sought to minimise its financial
liabilities for the accident and used its political and economic power to avoid a
trial in the US Courts where the damages would have bankrupted the company.
Instead, it fought to have the case heard in India. More recently, concerns about
the safety of clothing sweat shops producing goods for Western markets have
reignited concerns around exploitation (Radin and Calkins, 2006; Brown, 2015).
The emergence of stricter governance arrangements, fair trade policies and social
media activism in some Western countries have gone some way towards
addressing these forms of exploitation but they have only scratched the surface
of what remains a deep-rooted problem.
Finally, globalisation has also changed the demands relating to expert
judgments within risk assessments. The range of cultural settings over which
organisations work is often considerable and it requires a widening and a
deepening of the expert base within organisations in order to address specific
local conditions. The manner in which we judge expertise across such different
settings is also an issue that has implications for decision making around risks,
especially where there is no real actuarial basis upon which the risk judgements
are made. Thus, the nature of evidence, the validity of expert judgement, the
separation in space of experts from the entities that they judge, and the
increasing role of so-called big data, are all challenges that face organisations
around the management of risk and uncertainty.
Challenges for Holistic Risk Management
Against this background, organisations have sought new ways of dealing with
the management of risk that adopts a more holistic approach. Although
enterprise risk management (ERM) and, more latterly, resilience have sought
to take such a holistic approach, there are still conceptual and practical
challenges facing such perspectives. The first of these concerns the scale of the
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enterprise involved and the distance over which its activities are undertaken.
Both scale and distance generate problems around organisational controls, the
recognition of weak signals and the processes by which good governance is
maintained over time. The second challenge relates to the complex nature of the
interactions that take place between the elements of the production process and
the controls that are put in place to deal with variations in performance.
Emergent conditions can move the system away from its planned-for state and
have the potential to generate a new set of working practices that are dynamic
and invariably adapted to by local operators. If local violations of practice are
carried out ‘to get the job done’ and they are not formally reported to senior
management, then this emergent equilibrium state will invariably not be
captured either by those who designed the system or those who manage it.
Scale and distance can mitigate against effective reporting and governance. The
third challenge concerns the processes by which information is managed across
the breadth of the enterprise. Not only does this information have to be
captured, effectively codified so that it makes sense to others, and disseminated,
but it also has to allow for changes to be made to the functioning of the system
in a way that ensures effective feedback is in place. In addition, the enterprise
has to be certain that the very information technologies that enable it to
function effectively and at a distance, are not the source of an additional set of
risks. These risks can include data loss, as clearly illustrated by the case of
Edward Snowden (Greenwald, 2014), as well as the risks associated with the
hacking of key control technologies or the loss of underpinning infrastructures
(Chee-Wooi et al, 2008). Within a globalised setting, there are cultural as well
as distance-related factors that can mitigate against effective communication
and information sharing. Constraints around information flows can be espe-
cially problematic when it involves the performance of those critical infrastruc-
tures that are essential to the enterprise but which lie outside of its control (Boin
and Smith, 2006; Jenelius et al, 2010). Taken together, these factors require the
organisation to undertake a number of steps to ensure that the organisation is
able to take the holistic approach that ERM requires.
A first stage in this process is the development of awareness, commitment
and competencies around performance management, risk identification and
mitigation (Reason, 1993, 1995). This needs to be undertaken across the
enterprise and in such a way that it allows for effective objective setting to be
carried out, along with the creation of a supportive internal environment for
risk management (O’Donnell, 2005). It is the scale and complexity of this task –
the development of the so-called risk appetite within the organisation – that has
led some to argue that it is a fundamental flaw in the processes of ERM (Power,
2009). Another key stage in the process is the generation of a minimum
technical specification for performance (Cherns, 1976, 1987), against which
the management of risk can be evaluated. Again, this is likely to prove
problematic at the level of the enterprise because of the scale and cultural
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variations involved. At the outset therefore, it could be argued that effective risk
management is undermined by the processes of globalisation and the problems
are likely to become compounded when the formal processes of risk identifica-
tion and assessment are carried out. Here, the diffuse nature of the organisation
and the role of emergence across the various circuits and flows that underpin its
performance, are likely to generate significant levels of emergent conditions that
will require a dynamic form of risk assessment. At the same time, however, this
dynamic risk assessment is likely to be hampered by information constraints
and a search for technocratic solutions to complex multi-level problems. The
resultant ‘calculative cultures’ (Mikes, 2009) will ensure that the power of
technocratic elites is reinforced and this will have the effect of making the
decision-making processes around risk management even more opaque.
While the holistic approaches to risk management in a globalised environ-
ment that are offered by ERM are seductive, the challenges provided by
globalisation, and especially its darker characteristics, will invariably under-
mine the efficacy of risk management. As a result, risk assessment will always be
a flawed, albeit essential, management tool that can identify the parameters of
risk within a globalised setting but which cannot hope to provide the detailed
granularity that is required across the circuits and flows of people, resources
and information within the enterprise.
Conclusion
Globalisation is a defining element of the age in which we live, and one that
appears to play a significant role in embedding the potential for failure and
exploitation across a range of places and over time. Many of the problems that
will face future generations are currently being incubated as part of processes
that underpin globalisation and reside in the interconnecting spaces that are an
integral part of the process. This interplay between space, place and time within
the configuration of risks adds a further layer of complexity to the generation
of such problems as a function of globalisation processes. The power of
companies to move across international boundaries has highlighted the
difficulties that governments face in seeking to regulate their behaviours. Unless
international regulation is developed to deal with some of the more challenging
risk issues that relate to globalisation then it is likely that many of the problems
– and especially those that arise out of the uncertainty generated across space
and time – will continue to develop.
Although the opening up of global markets is seen by some commentators to
be creating wealth, thereby lifting some groups out of poverty, it is also seen as a
factor in condemning others to environmental degradation, exploitation and
the consequences of criminality, oppression and terrorism. The ongoing
problems of civil unrest and the Diasporas that they create have dominated the
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news headlines during 2015 and seem set to continue for the foreseeable future.
The aftermath of the sub-prime crisis also continues to create problems for
many countries as they seek to reduce their deficits by introducing austerity
measures. Such austerity policies have, in turn, fuelled an additional movement
of people and resources and highlighted the vulnerabilities that many govern-
ments faces as a function of their indebtedness to the agents of globalisation.
This article has sought to highlight the importance of the various circuits and
flows that are essential to the performance of the wider socio-economic system in
which risk is generated. It has argued that the movements of people, resources
and ideologies also have a potential dark side that generates new forms of risk.
The resultant uneven process of risk-benefit generation has led to the expression
of concerns around the role that democratic processes can play within the control
of such risks and the viability of existing approaches to risk management in
addressing the geographic scales over which many modern enterprises function.
Within this context, the role that expertise can play within more holistic
approaches to risk remains a contentious issue and particularly so for low-
frequency, high-consequence events. Although expert judgments assume a
considerable role in the determination of risk they are also open to abuse by
powerful interests (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986; Fischer, 1990, 2000). The
result is that a key element of the management of risk in a globalised setting
concerns the difficulties in maintaining the processes of governance and control.
The article has argued that the linked spaces of production and consumption
can, over time, generate spaces of destruction. The generation of destruction can
occur across different timescales and within different geographical settings and
this relationship requires a more holistic approach to the identification and
management of risk. Within this context, traditional approaches to risk manage-
ment have failed to provide the capability that is needed to address the multi-level
nature of the problems that arise from globalisation. This remains a challenge for
the risk management community to address, and one that needs to be carried out
both theoretically and practically. Calls for more inclusive approaches to dealing
with risk that recognise the limitations of our understanding of the nature of the
flows and circuits of capital and the impacts that they can have on emergence and
risk have highlighted the concerns that some within society have about our
abilities to manage scale and complexity within the processes of globalisation.
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Notes
1 Ultimately, terrorist actions that cause harm are criminal acts. The main differentiating
factor is the underlying drivers that shape the behaviours.
2 This point was made to one of the authors under conditions of anonymity. The company
concerned had incurred considerable direct and indirect costs in trying to combat this
illicit trade in counterfeit pharmaceutical products and remove them from the
marketplace.
3 The pressure group 38 degrees mounted a campaign against Unilever following the
spillage (home.38degrees.org.uk/2015/08/06/unilever-clean-up-your-mess/).
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